It is common clinical practice to interpret the pattern or profile of sub lest scores that children achi eve on individual tests of intelligence. Although generally regarded as cl inically fruitful. profile analysi s has not been empi rically supported. A new sublest profile has recently been proposed for the Wechsler Inlelli gence Scale for Chi ldren-Third Ed ition (W ISC-1II1.labeled SCAD, that is thought to be useful in the diagnosis of childhood disorders. Thi s study empiri call y examines the prevalence and diagnostic utility of the SCAD profile by comparing 363 students with learning and emotional disabilities to the WiSe -I II nonnati ve sample. Anal yses took into account both the sensitivity and specificity oflhe SCAD Index across its fu ll range of va lues via a ROC analysis. Resu lts indicated that the SCAD profile is neither a valid diagnostic indicator nor an important predictor of academi c ach ievement .
School psyc hologists have long attempled to max imi ze the di agnostic data derived from inte lli gence tests. Given the substantia l investment of time required to admi ni ster. score. and interpret these tests. psychologists are trained to ex tract as much informati on as possibl e from the assessment procedure. Based on a hi erarc hi cal, top-down model, sc hool psychologists typically begin by examining g lobal IQ scores. At thi s level, it is a common assumption that large di screpancies between verba l and perfonnance IQ's reveal some clinical abnonnali ty or pathology.
A generalization of the interpretati on of individual subtest patterns or profiles naturall y evolved (Kehle, Clark, & Jenson, 1993) . Subtest profile analysis rests on the conj ecture that the pattern of elevati ons and depress ions across individual sublest scores indicate unique cognilive abilities. The presumpl ion is Ihal such a mult id imensional view of intell igence provides greater insight into the nature of human abil ity than summary intellectual indices (Zimmerman & Woo-Sam. 1985) . Wec hsler's (1958) hypothesis that childhood schizophre nia could be detected by a unique pattern ofWISC subtests is an exemp lar of clinical profile analys is. This approach was extended by Bannatyne (1968) , who suggested that Wl SC su btest scores could be recategorized to identi fy chi ldren with learning disabilities. Bannatyne ( 1968 Bannatyne ( . 1974 recommended that rath erthan relyi ng on the traditi onal WISC Verbal and Performance IQs. subtest scores could be recategorized into "new" composite scores that woul d provide greate r utility in identifyi ng children with genetic dys lexia.
Eventuall y. more than 75 pattern s of subtest vari ation were identified fo r the Wec hsler series (McDermott. Fa ntuzzo. & Glutting. 1990) . Despite the populari ty of pro fil e analysis. empi rical research suggested that profiles fai led to offer any clinical ut ility beyond what could be deri ved fro m more global scores (Hale & Raymond. 198 1; Hale & Saxe. 1983 ). Further, a growing body of evidence indicates that cognitive sublesl profil es are ineffecti ve in discriminating between students with and without disabi lities (Kavale & Forn ess. 1984; Kramer. HenningStout. Ullman, & Schellenberg. 1987; Macmann & Barnett. 1992; Mc Dermott. Fantuzzo. & Glutting. 1990; McDermott. Glutting, Jones, Watkins, & Kush, 1989; Mueller, Dennis, & Short. 1986; Piedmont. Sokolove. & Fleming. 1989; Resc hly & Gri mes, 1990; Watki ns, 1996; Watkins & Kush, 1994) .
The prac tice of subtest pro file in terpretati on has flourished due to its intuitive appeal (B rac ken, McCallum. & Crain. 1993) and clinical tradition (S haw. Swerdli k, & Laurent, 1993). These forces continue to sustain the application of profile analysis with the most recent revision of the Wec hsler Scale fo r Children (Wl SC-III ; Wechsler. 199 1). More importantl y. Prifitera and Dersh ( 1993) recentl y offered preliminary empirical support fo r subtest analysis on the WI SC-IIl . They combined subrests from the WISC-III Freedom from Distractibil ity (FD) and Processing Speed (PS) indi ces to create a new pro file. The incidence of this profile within the WI SC-III standardizati on sample was rarer than it was wi thin a sample of 99 chil dren with learning disabilities and another sampl e of 65 children with Attenti on-Defici t Hyperactivity Disorder. Based upon these results. Pri fitera and Dersh ( 1993) suggested that these patterns would be "useful in the diagnosis ofLD and ADHD" (p. 53). Kaufman ( 1994) coined the ac ronym SCAD for th is new profile pattern (Symbol Search. Coding. Ari thmetic. and Digit Span subtests) and recommended that the SCAD index be subtracted from the sum of the Picture Completion. Picture Arrangement, Block Design, and Object Assembly subtests to create a comparison between SCAD and the Perceptual Orga nization (PO) Index. The PO Index was selected because it "provides the best estimate of cognitive fu nctioning for most children who are li kely to be referred for evaluation" (Kaufman. 1994. p. 222) . The SCA D subtests were hypothesized to tap important abilities (short-term memory. auditory processing, planning, visual-motor integration, sequencing) or pervasive behaviors (motivation, di stractibility) that were thought to constitute core deficits of a variety of exceptional learners. Kaufman ( 1994) opined that the Arithmetic, Coding, and Digit Span subtests have: bee n quite effective at identifying exceptional groups from normal ones, and ... are like a land mine that explodes on a diversity of abnormal populations but leaves most normal samples unscathed ... the fact that so many samples with medical, educational, and psychiatric-behavioral problems have difficulty wit h Arithmetic, Digit Span, and Coding has made the FD factor a small but potent bit of diagnostic information to consider when evaluating the presence of an abnormal conditi on in any chi ld referred for evaluation (p. 213).
Kaufman averred that the addition of Symbol Search created a " new tetrad [which] is a potent land mine for clinicians to continue to exploit when searching the WISC-II1 subtest profil e ... for diagnostic clues" (p. 2 14). The four SCA D subtests were posited to be "an important piece of evidence for diagnosing a possible abnorma lity" (p. 221), which "won't identi fy the type of exceptionality, but they are likely to be va lu ab le for making a presence-absence decision and helpi ng to pinpoint speci fic areas of deficiency" (p. 214).
C laims concernin g the SCAD profile's diagnostic and prescriptive utility are based upon statistically significant group differen ces. "Groups of [exceptional] children differ significantl y from normal children in the magnitude of the di sc repancy between PO and SCAD subtests" (p. 220). However, Meehl and Rosen ( 1955) warned psychologists that they wo uld be mi sled if they used "validity" or "di scrimination" between groups to justify diagnostic decision making. That caution was cogently reiterated by Elwood ( 1993) , who contended that "significance alone does not reflect the size of the group differences nor does it imp ly the test can discriminate subjects with sufficient accuracy for clinical use" (p. 409).
Although relatively rare in the social sciences, statistical methods ofdeterrnining the utility o f diagnosti c decisions have been developed and employed in such fields as medicine, materials testi ng, and weather forecastin g (Colliver, Vu, & Barrows, 1992; Swets, 1988; Wedding & Faust, 1989) . Kessel and Zimmerman ( 1993) desc ribed several of these diagnostic utility statistics: (a) Sensitivity, or tru e positi ve, the proportion of participants with a target di sa bility who are identified by a positi ve test finding; (b) Specificity, or proportion of participants free of the di sa bility who are correctly identified by a negati ve test result; (c) False Positive Rate, the proportion of participants identified by a positi ve test score who do not have the target di sability; (d) False Negative Rate, proportion of participa nts identified by a negati ve test score who have the target disability; and (e) Kappa, the proportion of agreement between the test and actual condition o fth. participants (d isabled vs. non-disabled) beyond that accou nted by c hance.
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the prevalence and diagnostic utility of the SCAD subtest profile among a group of children previously diagnosed as having learning and emotional disabilities.
METHOD

Participants
Students with Learning and Emotional Disabilities. Cases for this study were drawn from special education records of three southwestern, suburban school district special education programs. Students who received comprehensive psychological evaluations during a one-year period served as participants. Students were selected from special education records based upon two criteria: (a) cognitive assessment included 12 subtests oftbe WISC-III; and (b) enrollment in a learning disability (LD) or emotional disability (ED) program.
Placement in a special education program was determined by multidisciplinary evaluation teams following assessment by a certified school psychologist. Teams followed state special education rules and regulations that defined a learning disability as a significant ability-achievement discrepancy, and differentiated an emotional disability by one of five emotional characteristics adversely impacting educational progress.
These selection criteria identified 363 students enrolled in kindergarten through I I th grade. Median grade placement was 4th grade and 80% of the participants were in grades I through 6. Special education enrollment was 91 % in learning disability and 9% in emotional disability programs. Gender distribution was 70% male and 30% female. Ethnic identity, as reported by parents on school records, was 51% White, 23% Native American, 16% Hispanic. and 10% Black.
Academic achievement leve ls in reading, math, and written expression for 96% of the participants were measured with the Woodcock Johnson Tests of Achievement-Revised (Woodcock & Mather, 1989) . Academic achievement of the remaining students was assessed with four other achievement tests. Table I presents intellectual and academic achievement scores for participating students by special education classification. Although lower than average, cognitive and academic achievement levels were consistent with other compi lations of data from children enrolled in special education programs (Kavale & Nye, 1985) .
Students without Disabilities. These participants were from the standardization sample of the WISC-1Il (Wechsler, 1991) , as reported by Prifitera and Dersh (1993) . After children with Full Scale IQs less than 70 were excluded, the final sample consisted of 2, 158 children aged 6-16 years. This abridged WISC-ill normative group was considered to be a nationally representative sample of students without disabilities. 
Materials
The WISC-HI is an individually administered test of intellectual ability for children aged tHl to 1&-11 years. The test consislS of 12 subtests (M= 10; SD = 3) which combine to yield Verbal, Performance and Full Scale IQ's (M = 100; SD = 15).
Procedure
As per Kaufman (1994) , scaled scores on the Symbol Search, Coding, Arithmetic, and Digit Span subteslS were summed to create the SCAD index. The SCAD index was then subtracted from the sum ofthe Picture Completion, Picture Arrangement, Block Design, and Object Assembly subteslS to create a comparison between SCAD and Perceptual Organization (PO) cognitive skills. This PO-SCAD difference was calculated for all participants with handicaps and was extracted from Prifitera and Dersh's ( 1993) tables for participants without handicaps. Full Scale IQs, Verbal IQs, Performance IQs, factor index scores, PO-SCAD difference scores, and SCAD scores did not significantl y differ between children with learning and emotional disabilities (see Table I ). When Kaufman's (1994) caution concerning variabili ty between the FD and PS factors was incorporated, and only those students with absolute FD-PS differences of less than 16 points were retained, the students wi th learning disabilities (n ; 3 1S) and emotional disabilities (II; 30) did not significantly differ on Full Scale IQs, VerballQs, Performance IQs, facto r index scores, PO-SCAD difference scores, or SCAD scores. There were also no significant differences between cognitive measures when those students with learning disabilities whose abil ity-achievement discrepancies in reading exceeded 1.96 standard errors of estimate (II ; 72) were compared to students with emoti onal disabilities. Nor did any of these methods of grouping participants produce discrepant diagnostic utility statistics. Consequently, data from all 363 students wit h disabilities were combined for subsequent analyses.
The percentage of students with PO-SCAD difference scores were compared to those reported for the standardization sample (Prifitera & Dersh, 1993 ) via diagnostic utility statisticsat three difference levels: 7,9, and 12 points (representative ofp < . IS, .OS, and .0 I levels of significance). Table 2 presents the percentage of students who scored 1-18 points higher on the sum of the four perceptual organization subtests than on the SCAD subtests. The current participants exhibited: (a) less extreme PO-SCAD differences than tbe sa mple of 99 children with learning di sabilities analyzed by Prifitera and Dersh; (b) si milar PO-SCAD differences as those reported by Ward, Ward, Hatt, Young, and Moller (199S) for 163 children with learning disabilities, and (c) more extreme PO-SCAD differences than reported for the 2, IS8 chi ldren with IQ's above 70 in the WISC-UI standardization sample.
RESULTS
Diagnostic utility statistics are presented in Table 3 . Kappas of .02 to . 13 refl ect "sli ght" or "poor" agreement beyond chance (Kraemer, 1992) and are significantly different from zero only at the most extreme cutti ng score. Many children were miscategorized when the PO-SCAD was used as a diagnostic indicator. For example, only S6 of the 363 children with disabilities were properly detected by the most extreme PO-SCAD cutting score, in contrast to 199 children without disabilities who were misclassified as disabled and 307 children with disabilities who were misclassified as non-disabled.
Although Table 3 revea ls that the PO-SCAD difference does not efficiently separate children with disabilities from those without disabilities, it is possible that a smaller or larger PO-SCAD difference score would be a more efficacious cut score. This hypothesis was tested with an extension to standard diagnostic efficiency statistics that takes into account the balance between the sensitivity and specificity of a diagnostic test across all possible decision thresholds. This Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) was originally· developed in the context of elec- (1995) where n "" 217 in disabled and n "" 2. 158 in non-disabled groups .
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FIGURE I. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of PO-SCAD difference scores
used to distinguish between subjects with and without disabilities tronic signal detection experiments in radar, but it has been adapted and reformulated for biomedical applications (Hanley & McNei l, 1982; Kraemer, 1988; Murphy et aJ. , 1987; Swets, 1988) . ROC analysis does not depend on the prevalence of disabilities in the population and consequently provides a descri ption of diagnostic accuracy that is independent of both prevalence and decision thresho ld efTects (Me tz, 1978) . ROC analysis is typically presented in a graph that plots all of the se nsi tivity/false positive pairs resulting from continuously varying the test's cut score across the full range of possible cut scores. Each change in cut score will reduce one type of diagnostic error at the expense of increasing another type of diagnostic error (Dwyer, 1996) . Thus, a ROC analysis graphically represents a test's diagnostic accuracy across its full range of scores. As illustrated in Figure I , the ROC curve of a test with zero discriminating power is a diagonal line dubbed the " line of no information" or the "random ROC." The more accurately a test is able to discriminate between indi viduals with and without the target di sorder, the more its ROC curve wi ll deviate toward the upper left comer of the graph. Inspection of the ROC curve of Figure I , which is based on the current PO-SCAD data, reveals that it does not substantially diverge from the random ROC.
This subjective observation can be objectified by calculating the area under the ROC curve (AUC) (Colliver, Vu, & Barrows, 1992; Hanley & McNei l, 1982) to produce an overa ll index of the accuracy of the PO-SCAD comparison. A perfect predictor would produce an A UC of 1.0 whereas the random ROC always accounts for .50 of th e AUe. Swets ( 1988) suggested that areas of.5--. 7 indicate low test accuracy, .7-.9 moderate accuracy, and .9-1.0 hi gh accuracy. Based upon formul ae pro vided by Hsiao, Bartko, and Potter ( 1989) , the AUC of Figure  I summed to .59. As described by Murphy et al. . ( 1987) , the AUC "may be interpreted as an estimate of the probabi li ty that a randomly chosen ill person wi ll . at each threshold. have a higher test score than a randomly chosen well person" (p. 552). Interpretatively, the current AUC of .59 indicates that a randomly selected parti cipant with a di sability would obtain a hi gher PO-SCA D score than a rando ml y selected partici pant not di sabled 59% of the time. In contrast, tossing a coin would re sult in a correct classification rate of50%. Thus, th ere is no PO-SCA D cutting score that significantly exceeds chance d isc riminatory power. This performance is especiall y dismal within the contex t of ROC research in medical diagnostic imaging that typically ge nerates AUC's of .87 to .97 (Swets. 1988) and ROC studies of the diagnosis of depression with rating sca les th at produce AUC's ranging from .68 for the worst scales to .90 for the best sca les (Somoza, Steer. Beck. & Clark , 1994) .
Although not a va lid diagnostic indicator, the SCAD profile may instead be related to perfonnance on academic achievement measures. which could add to the predicti ve va lidity of the WISC-Ill. To test this hypothesis, participants' reading, math. and written expression scores were correlated wi th the SCAD while controlling for verbal comprehension and perceptual organization abilities. Results indicated that the SCAD index was not related to reading achievemen t (r = .045, P > . 10). but did covary with math (r = .17, P < .00 I ) and written ex pression (r = .145, P < .001) ski lls. While stat isticall y significant, the SCA D index and math achi evement shared only 2.9% of their variance, whil e the SCAD index and written expression achievement shared 2.1 % of their vari ance. Consequently, the SCAD profile is not an important predictor of academic achievement among children with disabilities.
DISCUSSION
The prevalence and di agnostic utility of the SCAD in distinguishing between children with learning and emotional disabilities and those without disabilities was investigated in th is study. As in previous researc h, children with di sabilities ex hibited larger mean SCAD scores than non-di sabled children . However, when SCAD profiles were used to classify students into disabled and non-disabled groups, the SCAD scores operated at ncar chance levels. Inaccurate classifications were replicated across all SCAD va lues. Nor was the SCAD profile a robust predictor of academic achievement among chi1dren with disabilities. In agreement with Wardet al. ( 1995) , these results suggest that the SCAD profile has " little utility in differential diagnosis" (p. 275) and is an inva lid addition to psyc hoeducational diagnostic practice.
It is commonly argued that subtest analysis is not a diagnostic procedure but, rather, a process of hypothesis generat ion allowing the cl inician to identify specific cogniti ve strength s and weak nesses (Bracken, McCallum, & Crain, 1993) . As stated by Kaufman ( 1994) , "The examiner' s main role is to generate hypot heses...and then confirm or deny these hypotheses by exploring multiple sources of evidence " (p. 15) . Given this perspecti ve, clinicians may believe Ihat the SCAD and other cogniti ve profiles wi ll generate hypotheses even if they are not valid diagnostic markers. This belief, whil e seemingly logical, cannot withstand close sc rutiny. As noted by Faust ( 1984) , "Even judgments that appea r to be si mpl e, on closer ana lysis, are found to contain complexity" (p. 5).
Although use of WISC-III subtest profiles to generate clinical hypotheses appears to be strai ghtforwa rd (Groth -Mamat, 1997; Kaufman, 1994) , unavoidable complex ity is introduced by cogniti ve errors that inevitably occur when decisionmak ing procedures fa il to appl y available nonllative judgment methods (Fa ust, 1984) . Cogniti ve errors are we ll documented and have been consistently demonstrated by both novice and seasoned clini cians (Faust, 1986) . Among the most ubiquitous of these flaws in human reasoning are under-utilizati on of base rates, misjudgment of co variati on, assoc iation of avai lability in memory with probability of occurrence, estim at ion of probabilities on the basis of similarity or representativeness, and over-reliance on confim13tory strat.egies (Arkes, 199 1; Davidow & Levinso n, 1993; Faust, 1984 Faust, , 1986 Faust & Ziskin , 1988; Wedding & Faust, 1989) . These cogniti ve inaccuracies interact wi th fundamental limitations in human infonnation processing to generate suboptimal decisions. This outcome has been substantiated in nearl y 100 studies in the social sciences where the accuracy of actuari al predictions was equal to or bener than clinical predictions (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989) . The complex interacti on of cogniti ve errors and limitations of reasoning that cause the clinical hypothesis generation process to go awry have been trenchantly illustrated by Faust ( 1986) :
Despite what supervisors tell their students abou t integrating data and examining configura J relat ions, the typical cognitive processes underlying psychodiagnosis are likely much closer to that ofthis example: The clinician proceeds to collect sufficient information to formu late and support (not test) hypotheses. As data are collected or analyzed, the clinician form ulates hypotheses about the patient, often quite early in the process. Hypotheses are based on a few salient cues. Subsequent data collecti on or analysis is overly influenced by these hypotheses; although th ey may be further elaborated or refi ned, they are rarely changed substantially .... Much of the subsequent search may be little more than an attempt to find sufficient evidence to confinn conclusions. The final conclusions are based not on complex configural analysis but on "counting noses ...... Data that might conflict wi th conclusions are either explained away (e.g., as test artifact), ignored, or molded to fit the hypothesis through mental gymnastics. The dynamic formulat ion used to explain tbe assumed pathological state is shaped by additional bad judgment habits ... .The process becomes an exercise in redundancy, extending the initial diagnostic conclusions to questions of cause while ensuring that a satisfactory answer is obtained regardless of its accuracy. In fact, no matter what their accuracy is, the search for such explanations is likely to increase confidence (p. 424).
Beyond the judgmental difficulties inherent in a clinical hypothesis approach, basic psychometric principles would predict a high rate of erroneous decisions. By beginning the decision-making process with a random component (the SCAD profile) and then searching for confirmation, the clinician cannot increase, and may even decrease,.judgment acc uracy when trying to detect a low incidence strength or weakness (Meehl & Rosen, 1955) . As Runimann (1994) summari zed: "Quality of information ... is a prerequisite to usefulness of information" (p. 27).
As in all experimental designs with nonrandom ass ignment, the results of this research are vu lnerable to threats to internal and ex ternal va lidity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963) . First, sampling variability must be considered, and these results should be generalized to other cli nical samples with cauti on. However, sampling error seems less of a threat to generalizabi lity as the current results closely accord with the data reported by Ward et al. (1995) and by Daley and Nagle (1996) from other samples of exceptional learners. Second, the natu rall y occurring assessments used in this research did not control for IQ-achievement test order. While there may ha ve been some nonspecific practice effects that occurred as part of this study, there is no evidence to suggest that this should have significantly affected the SCAD profiles. Finally, the present results may be limited due to the inherent inability to define " true" disabilities. In medical testing, for example, the trutn about each patient's di sease state can be determined by surgery or autopsy. Such certainty regarding the " true" status ofleaming and emotional disa bilities cannot be obtained and may have innuenced the current measurement of accuracy. Again, similar results from a variety of samples (Daley & Nagle, 1996; Ward , et aI., 1995) and from the mUltiple categori zations of the present sample reduce the likelihood of this threat. Basic scientific method demands that, " Hypotheses must be stated in such fash ion as to be capable of di sconfirmation by clearly designed and carefully described empirical studies" (Eisenberg, 1986, p. 477 ). The current investigation tested the hypothesis that the SCAD profile would be "useful in the diagnosis of LD and ADHD" (Prifitera & Dersh, 1993, p. 53) or would constitute "an important piece of evidence for diagnosing a possible abnormality" (Kaufm an, 1994, p. 221) and found the SCAD profile to be an invalid diagnostic indicator among children with learning and emotional di sabilities. When considering these results within the context ofiimitations in human information processing and the common propensity for clinicians to succumb to specific cognitive errors, appraisals that attribute clini cal meaning to subtest profiles such as the SCAD should be esc hewed. The utility of mental tests, while not exempt from criticism, must be judged by psychometric and statistical analyses rather than impressionistic and emotional reactions. The science of practice cannol be advanced by anecdotes (Shermer, 1994) , but must rely on reliable and valid assessmenl and diagnostic procedures.
